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The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of access
roads on the process of spontaneous colonization of virgin forest land

in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia .

An access road in the Department of

Santa Cruz serving an area opened up by spontaneous colonization was

studied.

The interpretation of aerial photographs and data collected

in the area were used to illustrate the importa nce of access roads for
successful spontaneous colonization .

General conclusions were drawn

with r egard to the role that spontaneous colonizat i on as a dynamic

force was playing in the development of Bolivia's tropical lowlands .
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ABSTRACT
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The purpose of this study was to in·Jestigate the impact of access
roads on the process of spontaneous colonization of virgin forest land

in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia .

An access road in the Department of

Santa Cruz serving an area opened up by spontaneous colonization was

studied.

The interpretation of aerial photo graphs and data collected

in the area were used to illustrate the importance of access roads for
successful spontaneous colonization .

General conclusions were drawn

with regard to the role that spontaneous colonization as a dynamic

force was playing in the development of Bolivia's tropical lowlands.

(88 pages)

INTRODUCTION

Bolivia is the fifth largest country in South America.
tion was estimated to be 4.7 million in 1970.
urban constituted 65% of the total.

1

Its popula-

Those classified as non-

The overall population density was

eleven persons per square mile , but this statistic is misleading because

70% of the population lives on the Altiplano and in the high valleys.
Larg e areas of the lm·.rlands in the Upper Amazon Basin are virtually
uninhabited .

Highland Bolivia is very poor.

In 1969 the per capita

income of the rural population was calculated at only $44 per anr.um.

2

The highlands are characterized by a harsh climate, extensively eroded
areas and generally depleated soils,

In the more favored areas of the

valley s there is considerable population pressure on the land.

Farming

units tend to be small, and crop yields are generally very low.
Lowland Bolivia , isolated from the highlands by extremely difficult
mountainous terrain, presents a complete con.trast.

It is very sparsely

populated with population density averaging less than t<;o persons per

squar e mile.
jungle .

The climate is tropical, and much of the land is virgin

The lowlands account for 70% of the total land area (Figure 1) ,

and is the least developed and most isolated region in the country.

The

agricultural potent i al of the area has not yet been assessed, bu t it is
considered by Bolivian government officials to possess enormous unused
natural r e sources and to be the last low - cost major unexploited land
resource for food production on an international scale in South America .
1 USAID Bolivia , Estadisticas Economicas, No . 13 (1971) , page 3.
2 Franklin Antezana Paz, "Ingreso anual per capita , " Presencia (La
Paz, July 12, 1972 ) , page 3.

2

E3

Valleys
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Tropical lowlands

BOUVuA ESJ

Altiplano

CRAZIL

Santa Cruz

ARGENTIN A

Figure l.

Physiographic Regions and Political Departments 3

3 Tennesse Valley Authority , A Fertilizer Program for Bolivia (Alabama, January, 1970), page 6.

3

Role of Colonization in Bolivian Development Strategy

Until 1952 the government policy on economic development emphasized

the mining industry and industrial development in the highlands.

After

the 1952 revolution, the development of the eastern lowlands received

top priority in the development strategy of the country.

Since the low-

lands were so sparsely populated, agricultural colonization from the

highlands was selected to play a key role in development of the region.
Colonization was to have three main objectives:

(1)

Correct the

unequal distribution of rural population with

regard to land resources .

85%

4

of Bolivia's rural population was crowded

into the resource poor highlands, while the tropical lmvlands comprising

70% of the national territory only had 15% of the rural population.
(2)

Diversify and increase agricultural production by promoting the

cultivation of tropical. and subtropical crops, such as rl.ce and sugar; in
order to reduce food imports, diversify exports and increase the national
income.

(3)

Populate frontier zones and renote areas in order to promote

their integration into the national life .
The role of colonization as stated in the government 1 s ten year

plan 1961-70 5 called for the resettlement of 100,000 families and the
cultivation of 250,000 hectares of new land in the tropical lowlands.
Between 1954 and 1966 the government selected three regions (Figure
2) to begin the process of colonization:

(1)

Alto Beni with a connecting

4rnstituto Nacional de Colonization, B.:1nco InterArnericano de Desar ro llo , Programa de Colonizacion Informe Final (La Paz, Bolivia, 1970),

page 1.
5 Republica de Bolivia, Junta Nacional de Planeamiento, Planeamiento

(La Paz, Bolivia , 1961), page 164a .

4

highway to La Paz , (2)

Cochabamba an d (3)

Chapare with a new road under construction to

the region to the north of Santa Cruz.

Santa Cruz ,

which had previously been isolated from the rest of the country, obtained
a route for marketing its ag ricultural produce on completion of the paved

road from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz in 1956 .
Colonization Programs in Bolivia

Directed co lonization

The cold arid highlands presented a very different environment to
the hot and humid jungles to which the highland Indians were supposed
to move.

Adaptation of the highland Indians to the tropics was considered

an extremely difficult task.

6

Even the Inca empire , of which Bolivia

was a part , never extended into the lowland tropical areas because of
the difficulties of health, communications, etc .
In recognition of this very different environment, the first pro-

grams of colonization were hi g hly organized.

The Cotoca project begun

in 1954 in the Department of San t a Cruz under the auspices of the Corpor acion Boliviano de Fomento (C.B .f.) and the United Nations provided
very comprehensive assistance.

Land was cleared in advance for the

settlers , and a monthly subsidy, housing , medical attention , credi t,
technical assistance and community services were provided.

This colon-

ization proved extremely expensive (US$3,350 per family) 7 and had very
poor r esu lts .

The poor results were due to the dependence of the

6llome J. He nney , et al., Report of Santa Cruz Area Deve lopment
Nission , U.S . Fo reign Operations Administration (1954) , page 21.
7 rnsti tut o Naciona l de Colonizacion Banco InterAmericano de
Desarrollo , Programa de Colonizacion Infonne Final (La Paz , Bolivia,

19 70), page 2.
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K. L. \Vess e l, An Economic Assessme nt of Pioneer Settlement in the

Bolivian Lowlands , Cornell Universi t y (1968) , page 33 .

6
colonizers on the sponsoring body and excessive paternalism on the part
of the project administration.
Colonization with less comprehensive support was tried next .

colonist

The

had to clear his land, build his house and plant his fields ,

but received land , foodstuffs for an initial period, technical help ,
seeds , medical care , credit and an infrastructure of roads.

The sponsor -

ing agencies were the C.B.F. a nd the military.
In 1965 the Bolivian government launched its most ambitious coloni zation program 1nth funds provided by the InterAmerican Development
Bank.

The plan called for 8,000 families to be settled on 300 , 000

hectares of state lands in the areas of Alto Beni and Chapare , and the
Yapacani Area of Santa Cruz.

A loan (51- TF-BO) for US$6.5 million was to

be used for infrastructure projects in the colonization ar eas as well
as to cover the cost of moving the colonists.

A complimentary loan

(29-5F-BO) for US$2 . 6 million was to be used as "start up " production
credit to be channeled through the agricultural cooperatives to be formed
in the colonization areas.

The objectives of the program as stated by

the newly created Institute Nacional de Colonizacion (National Colonization
Institute) were simila r to those given by earlier planners .
recognition lvas given to spontaneous colonization.

(1)

Howeve r ,

The objectives were:

To serve as a pilot project for the transplan t ing of rural pop -

ulation from the densely populated highlands.
(2)

Increase and diversify the agricultural production of the

country.

(3)

Serve as an incentive for the settlement of a large number of

spontaneous colonists on land in fluenced by the government p r oject.

The project is now completed and the final report to the InterAmerican Development Bank shows that directed colonization by the Bolivian
government has been an excessively costly method of sponsoring the settle-

ment of the "tropical frontier. "
project, 43% abandoned their land.

Of the 8,717 colonists sponsored by the
9

The main reasons given for the

abandonment were illness, transportation difficulties, bad selection of

land, and the desire to escape debts due to the project.

The project

appears to have suffered from the same evils as earlier directed projects :
excessive paternalism, political maneuver i ng, discontinuity of effort,

poor administration , and inadequate technical capability .

10

The average

cost of resettling a family under the project was US$1 , 605. 11

If account

is taken of the urgency of moving 100,000 families to the tropical lowlands, i t is seen that an investment approximating US$160 million is
totally beyond the economic capacity of the country .
Spont aneous Colonization

One of the results of the various government projects to actively
sponsor the movement of population to the tropical lowlands has been a
parallel incr ease in population moving on th eir own initiative.

Spon -

taneous colonization , which is movement of population without direct
government help or stimulus , has developed in those areas where th e re

existed free land o f re asonab le productivity and some sort of high"ay or
the anticipation of its construction .

9rbid ., page 40.
lOFrederick Zierten, Colonization in Bolivia (Hontero , 1971), page 6.
llrb id . , page 32 .

8

In contrast to directed settlement where services s uch as roads,
health, credit and extension were provided to attract settlers , spantaneous co lonization only required the buildin g of penetration roads to
connect the frontier areas with the highway system .

Once access roads

connected the new land resources with major urban ma rkets and centers

of population pressur e, a flow of people and capital to exploit the
economic opportunities resulted.

As mentioned previously , the government directed projects have a

dismal record with large scale abandonment by settlers and very slow
growth in relation to the massive doses of public capital applied.

In

general , high levels of state involvement in the settlement process
seem to have introduced rigidities leading to misallocation of r esources .
In contrast , spontaneous colonization, which is a direct response by

individuals to t he economic opportunities offered by quality of natural
resources, availability of markets and the viability of agricultu r e, has

shown great flexibility and growth.
In the Department of Santa Cruz since the completion of the Chochabamba-Santa Cruz highway in 1956 (F i gure 3) and its extension north to
Montero and the potentially rich provinc es of Ichilo, Santiesteban and
Sara in 1967 , betwe en 11,000 and 12 , 000 families
have arrived as co lonizers.

12

from the highlands

This colonization process has been to a

large extent spontaneous (70 - 80% of all immigrants).
These settle rs now make up about 10% of the population of the whole
Department and have made a very significant contribution to the economic

12seminario de Ideas y Proyectos Especificos, Comite de Obras Publicas
de Santa Cruz , Estr ategia para Consolida las Colonias Campesinas del

Interior en el Departmento Santa Cruz (1972) , page 1 .
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10
development of the region. 14

It is difficult to imagine that the devel-

opment of Santa Cruz could have been as dynamic as it has been without
the contribution of these colonizers opening up ne\v land and creating

new settlements and roads; and providing agricultural labor for the
expansion of major industries such as sugar cane and cotton.

Although

the Department has only 6% of the rural population of the country, it
already contributes 30% by value of the gross agricultural production and
produces 80% of the agricultural exports. 15

Even with this performance

the potential of the Department has hardly been scratched .

Of the 25

million hectares of potentially arable land available in Bolivia, 40% is
found in the Department, and as of 1972 only 180,000 hectares out of a
total of 10 million hectares were under cultivation.
Although the government had intended that its directed colonization
project should serve as an incentive to spontaneous colonizers, it was

caught unprep ared and without funds, studies, technicians and "know- how"
to face this massive movement of people to the new frontier.

Disadvantages of spontaneous colonization

Social and political problems
The sustained and massive flow of rural population from the highlands
to Santa Cruz may have been of considerable benefit to the country and
in particular to the Department of Santa Cruz , but it has also created
some significant social and political problems .
14 or. Ing . P. Dante Invernizzi, Proyecto Capacitacion de Colones,
Seminario de Ideas y Proyectos Especificos, Comite de Obras Publicas de
Santa Cruz (May, 1972) , page 2.
15 Jose Romero Loza , Politica Agricola, Seminario de Ideas y Proyectos
Especificos , Comite de Obras Publicas de Santa Cruz ( 19 72) , page 14 .

11

Since no government assitance for roads , medicine, water supply ,
etc., was initially available and the new colonists had very meager

financial resources , their living conditions were deplorable .

Their

health was often badly affected by tuberculosis, internal parasites,
tropical diseases and protein calorie deficiency.

fant mortality rates were over 300 per 1 ,00 0.

16

Not surp risingly, in-

Due to isolation, lack

of credit , ill-health, lack of experience with tropical agriculture and
chaotic crop marketing conditions , the settler's economic progress has
often been very slow .

In resentment against the social sacrifice endur ed

and the lack of government concern, extreme left -wing organizations such

as UCAPO (Union de Campesinos Pobres) were formed and took such radical
action as putting up road blocks, holding gove rnment officials captive
and taking over the haciendas

of large landowners (Chane Bedoya) .

colonization areas are regarded at present by government offic i als

The
17

as

potential focuses for guerrilla activity be cause of the social deprivation
experienced by the colonists .

Destruction of resou r ces
The colonist , being limited to hand labor , uses slash and burn
techniques to bring the jungle land into produ ction .

Rice is t he prin-

ciple crop grmvn because it has a guaranteed government support price
and gives a quick cas h return for the new colonist with its short growing
season.

Unfortunately , dryland rice is very sensitive to weed competitio n .

This results in a costly cycle where yields decline and labor demands fo r
16Hontero Community Health Proj ec t, Rural Health Services for Co loni es ,
Northern Provinces of Santa Curz (Montero, Bolivia, 1971) , page 3 .
l7~·Jiden Razuk Abrene, "Mensaje del Prefecto de Santa Cruz , 11 Presencia
(La Paz , Bolivia , August 18 , 1972), page 10.

12

weed control rise after the second year.

To keep farming the same land,

the farmer must change to permanent crops such as sugar cane, bananas
and pastu r e, or resort to chemicals and mechanized farming.

None of

these alternatives are open to the spontaneous colonizer because of lack
of capital and credit ; so he moves on to clear another small area .

By

using hand methods , the individual farmer is never able to cultivate
more than

2

to

4

hectares at one time .

The results of this situation

are the follO\<ing:
(1)

LO\< productivity.

(2)

Low income .

(3)

Low r ate of savings and reinves tment.

(4)

Abandonment of homesteads when all the high forest is cleared .

(5)

Instability in

co~~unity

formation and development .

Acco-rding to studies by the Food and Ag-ricultural O-rganization of
the United Nations (F . A.O.) experts , 100-120,000 hectares 18 of valuable
virgin forest are being destroyed each year in Bolivia .

The dynamic

energ y of the settler s has already resulted in unrestricted encroachment
int o forest areas .

There exists the great thr eat that these pioneer

families trapped in a position of subsistence fa rming on a nomadic basis
will cause degradation of wide areas of potentially very fertile land .
This degrada t ion of the land by clearing th r ough cutting and burning and
later abandonment causing the so - called

11

hollow frontier" has already

reached frightening proportions in some areas of Santa Cruz .

Present si tuati on
Spontaneous colonizat ion has become so popular that many would -b e
settlers are pressing forward on their own initiative.

The acceptance

18"Destruccion de la Cobertura Forestal ," Pano r ama , Edicion 33
(Santa Cruz , Bolivia , 1972) , page 2.

13

of this stream of immigrants requires the provision and opening up of

additional reception areas.

A clear decision by the government on the

role that these spon taneous colonize rs are to be expected t o play in the
national economy must be made.

Already considerable dislike and re sent -

ment against the highland colonizers has been gene rat ed in Santa Cruz
among the local population. 19

Howev er, for all the c urrent problems i f

managed and directed with i magina tion the process of moving people to the
r eso urc e rich lowlands, that sta rted as an expens i ve and not very successful governmen t initiative, can become a self - susta i n ing spo nt aneo us

movement and potent force in Bolivia ' s development.

19 widen Razu k Abrene, "Nensaj e del Prefecto de Santa Cru z, " Presencia
(August 18 , 1973), page 10.

14

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Since spontaneous colon i zation impl ie s only nominal pa rticip ation
of government in the settlement process, little i s known by gove r nmen t

about the conditions of th e settlers .

Poli tical demonstrations by the

colonists f rom time to time drew attent ion to the ir pli gh t, but little
has been done t o help them.
In order that government may be able to manage and direct spontaneous co l oni zation fo r t he grea tes t benefit of a ll concerned, an under-

standing of the economics of this type of development should be obtained .
The specific objectives of this study were to assess :

(1 )

The viability of the agriculture practiced by spontaneous

colonists in th e region of Santa Cruz.

(2)

The impact of spontan eous colon iz ation on agricultural produc-

tion and employment generation in the area .
(3)

The econom i c r e turn to public inve stmen t in infrastruct ure in

support of spontaneous colonization .

(4 )

The soc ial and economic conditions of the colonists.

( 5)

The long-run i mplica tions of present trends in the area .

(6)

The policy impli ca tions f or the government concerned with en-

couraging economic develo pme nt on the one hand and wis e use of resources
on the other.
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SETTING OF THE STUDY
Brief History of the Road
The area selected for study was the Chane - Piray region north of
Santa Cruz (Figure 4).

Aerial photographs taken in 1964 show the area

from Chane to Piray to be entirely covered by high forest except for one
isolated ranch.

In the same year the Gulf Oil Company pushed through an

oil exploration track .

A very smal l trickle of conlonists then began to

occupy land along the track and cut down the forest.
In 1966 wi.th the prospect of imminent completion of the paved road
north from Hontero to Cuatro Ojitos , and thus a link to Santa Cruz and
the national market, more colonists started to push north along the oil

exploration track that had been partially kept open by loggers extracting
the rich mahogany reserves of the area .
colonies

In 1967 and 1968 the various

organized into sindicatos or farmer ' s unions for the purpose

of getting title to their land.

By 1969 the colonists '"ere sufficiently

organized and had enough agricultural production for sale that it became
an urgent necessity to improve their access road, tvhich

~vas

impassable to

motor traff ic most of the year and which caused them great hardship,
isolation, and loss of sales .

Each colony took responsibility for their particular stretch of the
road .

The sindlcatos in the area between San Pedro and Hardeman

(Figure 4) colle c ted $bl00 from each colonist (if the colonist did not pay,
he was threatened with loss of his land) and with a total of $b47 ,000
on their own initiative hired two D- 8 bulldozers from a road contractor
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(Bartos Cia) to build up the road platform.

All colonists in the area

(540 turned up) had to give two weeks of free work.
chop down the forest in front of the bulldozers.

Their work was to

Due to astute public

relations and political pressure by the colonists on a sympathetic govern-

ment , the Servicio Nacional de Caminos ( National Road Service) provided
a survey team to select the best alignment for the road , and finally a
motor grader to smooth off the l·mrk of the bulldozers.
was finished in January, 1971.
been done on a community basis .

The road work

Maintenance of the road since then has
However , the road has deteriorated badly

through use by loaded trucks when wet and in many places can be described
as little more than a canal in the wet season and a trench in the dry
season .

Reasons for Selection of the Road
The road from Chane to Piray was chosen for the following reasons :

(l)

The soils of the area being opened up are some of the richest

in Bolivia. 20

The fertility of the soils gives every chance for the

establishment of a permanent agricultur al system rather than a nomadic
slash and burn system , if the inputs of technology and capital become

available at the right time.
(2)

The area is representative of almost 1 ,000,000 hectares of top

quality land on the east bank of the Rio Grande (Figure 4) which is still
almost totally unoccupied and has been completely inaccessible by r oad .
The area, however, is

nO\Y

being opened up by the government for settlement .

20T . T . Cochra n, A Land System Map of Central Tropical Boliv ia,
Minist r y of Agriculture, Bolivia-British Agricultural Mission (Santa Cruz ,
Bolivia, 1967), page 80.
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Little more than access roads, wel ls for water supply and medicines are

being promised by the government in this recently initiated low-cost,
semi-directed project.
(3)

21

The area has been opened up entirely by spontaneous settlement.

The only assistance given by government , und er mounting pressure from the

established settlers , has been the drilling of artesian wells for water
supply , assistance in improvement of the access road, and the supply of

teachers and health workers for the schools and dispensaries built by
self help.
(4)

The access road runs down the middle of a long tongue of good

quality land that is surrounded by the swamps of the Rio Grande to the
east and the swamps of the Rio Piray on the west (Figure 5).

This isola-

tion provides a hinterland area with no interf e rence from other access
roads.

Also, since the tongue of land is never more than 15 kilometers and
in most places only 10 kilometers across , most farms are very close to
the access road.

This means that a one dimensional rather than two

dimensional model demonstrates the

effec~

of deterio rating transportation

facilities along the road.

2lrnstituto Nacional de Colonizacion, Projecto de Colonizacion San
Julian (La Paz, Bolivia, 1971) .
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DATA COLLECTION AND PROCEDURE
Use of Aerial Photography
Because no records were in existence except the aerial photographs

taken in 1964, and a scattered settlement pattern made sampling on the
ground difficult, it was decided to take aerial photographs of the area.
The use of a e rial photographs fo r providing some of the initial data
needed has many attractive feat ures.

A large a rea can be photographed

quickly and photographs will show details exactly as they appear on the
ground .

In lo cations such as the flat Santa Cruz lowlands where

photographic scales are not appreciably altered by topographic changes,
areas can be measured directly on contact prints with considerable
accuracy .

22

Accordingly, the area was flown and photographed by the Bolivian
Air Force on Monday, June 19 , 1972, at a scale of 1 : 30,000 .
was lat e r checked on the grou nd.

This scale

This scale gives enou g h definition on

the photographs for the hectareages of the more important crops and
different vegetation types to be recognized and totaled .

A mosaic of

the photographs was prepared for the total length of the road.
Calculation of Areas of Crops and Vegetation Types

The device used for determining areas on the aerial photographs was

a dot grid .

A dot grid is a transparent overlay with dots systemat icall y

22 u. S . De partment of Agriculture , Forest Service , "Forester's Guide

to Aerial Photo Interpretation," Agriculture Handbook, No. 308 (Washington ,
1969).
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arranged on a grid pattern.

In use, the grid was aligned with a straight -

line feature (the road) to avoid position bias and then dots were tallied
for each crop and vegetation typ e .

Type areas were calculated by pro-

portions , i.e., the number of dots of a given type divided by the total
number of dots counted yielded a percentage value that was multiplied by
the total area to obtain the hectareage of each type.
separate areas were measured.

Initially nineteen

For convenience in the final analysis, the

various areas that showed conunon features \vere amalgamated into six

sectors along the length of the ro ad .

The proportions of the various

crops and vegetation types \vere then calculated for each sector .

Use of Data from Aerial Photograph s

The data from the aerial photographs were then combined with results
from the field study made betwe en April and July, 1972, in the project
area and used to calculate the following:
(1)

Total land area under cultivation .

(2)

Gross regional agricultural production.

(3)

Total number of beneficiaries.

(4)

Increase in employment.

(5)

Total public investment.

In order to clarify the economic factors operating along the ChanePiray road, complimentary socio-economic data were collected.

In addition,

four conununities on 1vhich economic data \.Jere available were selected to

illustrate the change in economic conditions with deteriorating trans -

portation facilities along the road.
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RESULTS OF THE STUDY

Crops Grown in the Area

The climate of Santa Cruz is suitable for a wide range of tropical
and sub-tropical crops.

Unfortunately , markets do not exist for most of

the crops that could be grown by the colonists.

The domestic market is

small and can easily be saturated by minor increases in production.

Due

to the high cost of transport, exports of agricultural products (cotton
excepted) are not competitive with alternative sources of supply in
neighboring countries .

The spontaneous colonizers, being at the

11

fron-

tier11 or extreme end of the road network and being served by a chaotic ,

inefficient and exploitive marketing system, find themselves at a distinct
disadvantage when competing in the domestic market.

Rice

As part of the program for national self-sufficiency in food production guaranteed prices have been given by the government for rice.
Attracted by the stable price , spontaneous colonizers have become major
producers of rice.

The particular advantages of rice for the colonist

a r e that it can be produced with hand labor (his major resource) , requires
simple technology , gives a quick return, and has a guar anteed market.

Sugar Cane
Sugar cane, the second crop with a guaranteed price , also has the
advantages of using large quantities of hand labo r and simple technology .
However, the crop cycle is much l onger (five years) and requires a much
greater capital investment.

Until 1970 , the quotas for delive r y of cane
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to the sugar mil ls were co ntrolled by the large cane gro we rs (Federa cion
de Canieros) and considerable pressure was used to keep the small producers out of the industry.

Since 1970 and the drastic reduction in

sugar production which necessitated imports from Brazil, the quota

system has been abolished.
The reduction in sugar production was in large part due to the large
grmvers taking their land out of cane and putting it into more profitable
cotton production.

This abolishment of the cane quota system has allmved

the longer established colonists with a better location near access
roads to rapidly expand their cane plantings.

Sugar cane profitability,

however, is extremely sensitive to transport costs as will be shown later
and becomes an alternative to rice production only in the best locations.

Bananas
Of t h e c rops that do not have a government suppo rt price, hanan as

are well adapted to peasant production if the physical growing conditions
are suitable.

In the area studied, rainfall and soil conditions provide

high yields of good quality.

The problem is marketing the crop.

Bananas

are extremely perishable, unlike the alternative crop, rice, that can be
stored for months as rough or unhusked rice.
they must be marketed immediately.

When b a nanas are mature

Banana production is, therefore,

sensitive to the reliability and regularity of transport services.

Maize and other crops
Maize is another crop that yields well and in th e area studied can
g ive two harvests per year.

Unfortunately, the ma rketing situation is

very chaotic Hith prices moving through wild swings.

In two lveeks in

Santa Cruz in 197 1, the price dropped from $b30 to $bl7 per quintal.

In
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April, 1972, maize was selling for as low as $b8 per quintal in Montero,
the main service town for the colonists.

Along the access road colonists

claimed that the ir harvest costs were $b6 per quintal and that t r ansport
to Hontero cost $b4 per quintal.

Hany of the farmers did not intend to

plant maize again except for their home needs.

The same story of glut

or famine can be repeated for such crops as potatoes, yuca and citrus
which are mainly g rmvn for home consumption because of the difficulties

of marketing .

Analysis of the Aerial Photographs and Changes in Land Use
As can be expected from the above discussion, analysis of the aerial
photographs shm.ved that only rice, cane and bananas were grown in com-

mercial quantities during the 1971-72 rainy season .

Little evidence was

found of the sizeable maize plantings reported for 1970-71

23

in the area .

For the purposes of analysis, the small areas of maize, potatoes, yuca ,
and citrus planted for horne consumption 1.vere i gnored .

The percentages of scrub regrowth and high forest were included
in the analysis because they showed firstly the intensity of land use,
and secondly the dangers inherent in nomadic "slash and burn" cycles of
rice growing where high fo r est had to be cont inually cut down to replace
weed infested rice land.

The ratio of the two percentages , in areas

of rice monoculture , was an ind ication of how soon the colonists would

run out of high fo rest and be forced to move on to look for new land to
repeat their destructive cycle .

23 Kenneth Graber , La Vida Agricola en las Colonias, Comite de Obra
Rural, Distrito Or iental I glesia Evangelica Netodista en Bolivia (1972),
page 15.
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Changes in land use patterns

From analysis of the aerial photographs, the road was divided into
six representative sectors.

As a cont rol o r basis for comparison, a

seventh analysis \vas made at Cuatro Oj itos three kilomete rs before the

end of the paved road.

This seventh analysis was included because the

colony was founded at a much earlier date (1956).

It was considered

that land use patterns would be a function of both l ength of time of
settlement and quality of transportation facilities .

The particular

area chosen at Cuatro Ojitos for analysis had the same level of fertility
as l and along the access road studied.
Land use patterns were found to change quite rapidly as transport
distances increased and roads deteriorated, Table 1 , page 26 .
Sugar cane
As can be noted , commercial sugar cane production extends for 14

kil ometers do\vn the acc ess road.

The are a is known to produce extremely

high yields of sugar cane both because of its well distributed rainfall
and its rich alluvial soils.

Yields in excess of 70 tons of cane per

hectare are spoken of as common place.

In comparison, the average

national yield for 1970-71 was only 24 tons per hectare.

Many colonists

further do·wn the road show great interest in g rowing cane now that the
quota system has been abolished .

However , when the transport costs

involved are examined, Table 2 , page 27 , it is seen why the greater
distance discourages sugar cane production .

Transportation costs at the

most distant grower sites could reach as much as 65% of the total value
of the cane delivered to the mil l.

Table l.

Pe r centage of Each Sector in Different Uses , Chane - Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971-72

Sector

Year Settled

Cuatro Oji tos

(l)
Chane

Aguais

1956

1965

1965

0- 6

6- 14

Distance from
paved ro;J.d in
kilometers

(2)

(:3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Sagrado Corazon

San Pedro

Ca1ama

El Carmen

1966

1966

1967

1970

14-26

26 -3 4

34-65

65-85

Land Use (%)
Suga r Cane

35.2

20.1

9.2

Bananas

2. 3

8.7

12. 5

2.6

0.7

0.3

Rice

1.0

4.9

14.0

16.3

12.2

7.5

1.3

49 . 9

40.5

26.2

60 .3

50.9

22.5

2.2

~

25.8

38.1

20 . 8

36.2

__2'l:_]_

...1.§..:2

100 . 0

100.0

100 . 0

100 . 0

100.0

100. 0

100.0

Scrub RegroiJth
High For es t
Total

N

"'
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Tab l e 2 .

Cost of Transport in Sugar Cane Production, Chane-Piray Area,

Bolivia, 1972

Cost of
Average
Percent
Transport
Distance
from
of
Value Costs to
Guabira
Distance Sector in of Cane
Sugar
from Paved
Sugar
at Hill
Hill
Sugar
Kmsa
Road Kms
Cane
$b/Ton
$b/Ton
Hill

Sector

as a %
of Price
Received

by Grower
at Hill

Chane

42 -48

0-6

20.1

90

35

38%

Aguais

48 -56

6-14

9.2

90

45

50%

56-68

14-26

90

59b

65%

Sagrado
Corazon
3

Transport

Kms or kilometers.

bExtrapolated from cost for other sectors .

Bananas

Bananas are bought on the farm by i ndep endent truck owners either
on their own account or for fruit merchants in Montero, Santa Cruz or

Camiri.

When the trucks can pass along the access road during a dry

spell, the price paid for bananas is $b2 per stem.

Distance from the

paved road seems to make no difference in the price paid.

Once the

weather deteriorates and the road becomes a quagmire, trucke rs are
extremely cautious about
in deep "mud holes

out.

11

venturing dmvn the road in case they get stuck

and tvaste three or four days in digging themselves

With fruit maturing and few truckers daring to venture down the ro ad ,

the price of bananas drops rapidly.
per stem.

Colonists are happy to accept $b . SO

Those farthest d01;n the road have the least chance of conlud-

ing a sale.
Banana production is not as commercially attractive as sugar cane
production, but is still a lot more attractiv e than growing rice (see
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Table 4, page 30).

It

has the great advantage that the crop can be used

to follow two years of rice instead of abandoning the rice land to weeds
and scrub regrowth.

This means that the expenditure of clearing high

forest for producing rice for only two or three years is not wasted as in
the "rice only " cycle where the land reverts to scrub.

Since bananas can

be considered a tree crop with more flexibility in timing of cultural
operations, its cultivation allows good use to be made of family labor
during slack times in the agricultural year.
Banana production also provides a more permanent agricultural base
\Vhich the colonist can use to step out of the cycle of nomadic rice culti -

vation disc ussed previously.

It gives the colo nist a chance to establish

a more permanent agriculture and start to acc umulate capital.

Table 1,

page 26 illustrated that as cane production becomes progressively more
uneconomical because of high transportation costs, it is replaced by
banana production.
Banana production reaches a peak in the Aguais sector which is only
6-14 kilometers f rom the end of the paved road.

Production then drops

rapidly because of the increased unreliability of transport to collect
the mature fruit .
Rice
As has been discussed previously, ri ce production plays a ve r y important part as the principle cash crop during the initial years of the
spontaneous colonist while he is trying to establish himself .

Apart from

its advantages of a guaranteed market, short growing cycle, etc . , it can
also be stored for considerable lengths of time after harvest as rough or
unhusked rice without serious deterioration.

This allows considerable

time flexibility for the access road to dry out so that trucks can enter
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and transport the rice for market ing.

Also, r ice pr ofitability is

relat ively less sensitive to increases in tr a ns port costs due to dist ance

f rom the market at the ric e mill (Table 3, belm,).

Transportation costs

Here found to vary from 6% to 12% cf the total value of t he rice at the
mil l.

Table 3 .

Sect or

Farm Gate Value of Rice and Tran spo rt aion Costs, Chane - Piray
Area , Bolivi a , 1972

Value of
Incidental Tr ansport
Cost of
Rough Rice
Delivery
Co st s to Fa rm Gate Transportation
at Hill
Costs
Santa Cruz Val ue per as % of Price
Fanegab per Fanega Fanega
pe r Fanegaa
Received by
Farmer at Nill
$b
Sh
$b
$b

Chane

161

9

11

141

6%

Aguais

161

9

11

lid

6%

Corazon

161

9

12

140

7%

San Pedro

161

9

14

138

8%

Calama

161

9

16

136

9%

El Carmen

161

9

20

132

12 %

Sagrado

3

0ne fan ega is equival e nt to 384 pounds ri ce in hull .
brncid e ntal del i ve r y costs per fanega :
Four sacks at $b5 usable for t hree years $b7
Unloading tr uck at $bl per fanega
1
1
Drying ri ce in hull on drying floor
Total
$b9

Certainly, compa r ed to sugar cane and bana na produc tion , ri c e i s the
obvious choice \Vhe re transport facilities are minimal .
dence that it is "the" pioneer crop .

It is no coinci-

As will be noted in Table 1, page

2 6, rice grows in importance as one goes down the access r oad and transport
facilities deter i o rate .
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Net return to land and management
To ge t an understanding of the importance of location on the relative

profitablity of various crops and the reasons for the rapid changes in
land use patterns described previously, the r eturn to land and management

has been calculated for each crop (Tabl es 30 to 32, pages 78 to 80) .
tables a r e summarized

below in Table 4.

These

The extremely large differences

in return per hectare to land between the beginning and the end of the
road can be viewed as an economic return or rent due to loc a tion .

This

r eturn to location would be expressed in rents or capitalized into sale
value of land given a functioning land market in the area.

Table 4 .

Net Return to Land and Management for Various Crops, Chane-

Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971- 72

Distance From

Paved Road
Sector

Kilometers

Sugar Cane
$b/Hectares

$b/Hec tares

Rice
$b/ Hectares

Bananas

Chane

0-6

1332

363

333

Aguais

6-14

832

363

333

Sagrado Corazon

14-26

132

23 0

323

San Pedro

26 - 34

142

311

Calama

34 - 65

142

283

El Carmen

65-85

243

Scrub r egrowth and high forest
The significance of the percent ages of scrub regrowth and high forest
in the various sectors in Table 1 , page 26 , is that they give an indication

31
of how much of the original asset, the fertility of the high forest , is
st ill available to the colonist .

\-!here rice cultivation is practiced

almost exclusively, such as in the sectors of Sagrado Corazon and San
Pedro, the percentages give an indication of how far advanced is the
cycle of

11

Slash and burn" cultivation .

The sector of Sagrado Corazon is

particularly noticeable in that 80% of the hi gh forest has been destroyed
and that 60% of the land area has already been abandoned to scrub regrowth,
while closer to d1e paved road the sectors of Chane and Aguais only show
percentages for land abandoned to scrub regrowth of 40% and 26% respectively .

The stabilizing effect of perennial crop production of sugar

cane and bananas is very obvious .
If consideration is given to the fact that rice production only
reached sizeable proportions in 1968-69, it will be seen that it is not
unreasonable to suggest that by 1974-75 all high forest will have been
eliminated in the sectors of Sagrado Corazon and San Pedro .

Once the high

forest is eliminated, rice production in the 1.:..reed infested scrub regrmvth

will become uneconomical and most colonists will be forced to abandon
their land , homes an.d cormnunities

and move on to look for new land

unrestricted l1igh forest to devastate .

~.;ith

A cycle that tl1e Bolivian govern-

ment cannot allm..r to expand and proliferate \.Jith all its attendant social
instability , misery, and destruction of valuable forest resources .

The

alter natives available to the Bolivian Government to break the nomadic
rice cycle are discussed in a later section.
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Economic Balance Attributed to Development

of the Chane-Piray Area

Farm gate value of regional agricultural
production marketed
The farm gate value per hectare for each crop was calc u lated from
production figures quoted as being average for the area both by colonists
interviewed and by agricultural extension officials responsible for the
area .

Transport costs '"ere subtracted in the case of sugar cane (Table

2, page 27) and rice (Table 3 , page 29) .

The total area of each crop for

each sector was found by multiplying the percentages for the sector
(Table 1 , page 26) by the total area of the sector measured by planimeter
(Table 5, page 33).

The farm gate value per hectare for each crop was

then multiplied by the different hectareages to give a value for the
total number of hectares (Table 6, page 34).

A global value for the farm

gate value of the regional agricultural production marketed in 1971-72
is $bl4 , 230,918.

The assumption was made that the conservative yield

figures used in Table 6 , page 34 , allowed for a small part of the crop to
be used for home consumption.

Most of the colo!lists are from the highlands

\·Jhere maize and potatoes are the favored staple foods .

Even though they

grmv bananas and rice connnercially , these foods only make up a small

part of their diet.

Employment generation

In 1960 the United Nations estimated that about 40 percent of the
l abor force of South America "as either unemployed or underemployed.24
24

William C. Thiesenhusen ,

11

Latin America ' s Employment Problem ,"

Science, Volume 171 (Harch 5, 1971), page 868.

Table 5 .

Percentage and Area of Each Sector in Different Uses, Chane - Piray Area , Bolivia 1971-72

Sector

(l)

(2)

~

(3)

(5)

(6)

Sagrado
Chane

Agu<>is

Corazon

San Pedro

6- 14 Kms

14 - 26 Kms

26-34 Kms

Calama

El C.Jrme n

Total

Distance
f rom

Paved Roa d

0-6 Kmsa

34-65 Kms

65-85 Krns

- --- ----- --------------- ---- -------------- -- ------Land Use
Cane

%

Hab

20 .1 1,090

!
9.2

Ha

%

833 - ----

Ha

%

Ha

!

Ha

%

lla

Ha

----- -- --- ----- - ---- ------ ----- --- -- -

1 , 923

-- ----

1,949

Bananas

8. 7

472

12.5

1 , 131

2. 6

237

0. 7

54

0. 3

55

Rice

4.9

266

14 . 0

1,267

16.3

1 , 485

12 . 2

947

7.5

1 , 367

1. 3

177

5 , 509

40 . 5 2,198

26.2

2,371

60.3

5 , 494

50.9 3 , 954

22.4

4 , 083

2. 2

297

18 , 397

~

12 , 704

...2.U

]2,868

35,127

100 . 0 13 , 342

62 , 905

RegroHth
High Forest
Total

l , 400

~

3 , 448 _1Q.Jl_

1,895

100.0 5 , 426

100.0

9 , 050 100 . 0

9 , 111 100 . 0 7,767

~

~

2 , 812

100.0 18 , 209

aKms or kilometers .

bHa or hectares.

w
w

Table 6 .

Farm Gate Value of Cro ps Harketed, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 1971-72

(1)

(2)

Aguais

Chane

Sector
(3)
Sag r ado Co ra zon

(4)
San Pedro

(5)

(6)

Calama

Total

El Carmen

Distance

from
Paved
Road

0- 6 Kms 3

6- 14 Kms

14- 26 Kms

26-34 Kms

34-65 Kms

65-85 Kms

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Land Use
Canec

Hab

Value

1,090 2,997,500

Ha

Value

Ha

Ha

Value

Ha

Ha

Value

1 , 923

4,871,750

48,510 --- ---- ---

1, 949

1 , 719 , 018

!:l2

5,509

7,640 , 150

Va l ue

Ha

Value

833 1 , 874 ,2 50 ----- --------- - ---- --- ----- - ----- --------- --- --- ----

Bananasd

472

416,304 1,131

997,542

237

Ricee

266

375,060 1 , 267 1 , 786,470

~~

Total

Value

209 , 034

54

47 , 628

55

2 , 079 , 000 --'?.!!]_ 1 , 306 , 860 1 ,3 67 1,859 , 120

233 , 640

1 , 828 3 , 788 . 864 3 , 231 4,658,262 1 , 722 2,288,034 1 , 001 1 , 354 , 488 1,422 1,907,630 177 233,640

9 , 318 14,230,918

aKms or kilometers .
bHa or hectares .

cY ield estimated at 50 tons / Ha valued at $b90 / ton delivered at Guabira sugar mill.
dyield estimated at 24 , 000Kgrs/Ha valued at $bl per 60 lbs bunch giving a farm gate value of $b882 per hectar e.
eYield estimated at 10 Vanegas of rough ri ce/Ha valued at $b l 61/Fanega of rough rice delivered at Sant Cruz ri ce mills.

...

w
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The unofficial figure for Bolivia's unemployment and underemployment r ate

was stated as being as high as 50% of the work force in 1972.25

Because

of the restricted opportunities in the overpopulated and resou r ce poor
highlands, the rural population has been moving into the cities.

The

shanty tmms that are found on the outskirts of La Paz, Cochabamba and
Santa Cruz are a symptom of this migration.

\.Jhen these rural migrants

arrive in the towns they have no training or skills to help them find
employment.

Even i f these rural migrants could be trained, the local

manufacturing industries would not be ab l e to expand sufficiently to

absorb them .

The rural poor a rriving in the tm.rns constitute a highly

volative and unstable element in the urban and national political scene .

It could be argued that a considerable part of Bolivia ' s political instability can be bla med on the festering problem of the urban unemployed.
Anything that the Bolivian governme nt can do to keep these people on the
land rather than flooding into the cities \vould reduce the social costs

and malad justments related to premature migration.
A positive value could be put on keeping the rural poor underemployed
in the countryside rather than totally unemployed in an urban setting with

the attendant high social costs.

An alternative solution co uld be to

encourage the rural poor to immigrate to the lm.;lands to put idle land
and labor into productive use.

Spontaneous colonization provides an

extremely useful and low cost safety valve to the government for the pro -

blem of rural population growth and increased l a ck of opportunities that
would otherwise force a flood of rural unemployed to the t01.rns to look fo r
economic opportunity.

The Bolivian gove r nment ' s problem is to ensure

2 5"Foreign Investors Show Hore Interest in Bolivia,

Americas (November 15 , 1972), page 6 .

11
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that spontaneous colonization offers sufficient economic opportunity

through development of markets for agricultural production so that the
colonization option is selected.

The contribution of development of the Chane-Piray Area to employment
generation of 4.530 man/years of full-time employment in 1971-72 is given
in Table 7, page 37.
The incr ease in average size of holding for areas further down the
road and settled later in time, noted in line 2 , Table 7, page 37, is due
to the fact that the maximum land entitlement authorized by the agrarian
reform la" was inc reas ed from the original 30 hectares to 50 hectares.

26

This change was made because the "rice only 11 cycle requires much larger

quantities of land.
As will be noted in Table 7, page 37, no data was available for the
El Carmen sector, because the land has only r ecently been allocated and
colonists were just starting to move in.

From the beginning of the access

road to the sector of Calama , all land that is suitable fo r cultiviation

(not subject to flooding) has been allocated.
As

~vi 11

be noted from Table 7, page 37, the use of hired labor is

surprisingly high .

The ratio of hir ed labor to total labor used in

production ranging from 1:2 for Chane and Aguais to 1:3.5 for Calama is
a useful index of colonist involvement and integration into the wider
economy.

The high use of hired labor shows how strong the orientation

of the colonist is to the money economy.

Most of the labor is hired for

either the two months of the rice harvest or the three months of the sugar
cane harvest.

Each colonist will have up to five laborers working for

26 Abraham Maldonado , Derecho Agrario (La Paz , Bolivia , 1956), page
331.

Table 7.

Employment Generation, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 1971-72

Sagrado
Chane

Aguais

Corazon

San Pedro

Calama

El Carmen

Totals

5,426

9,050

9,111

7,767

18,209

13.342

62,905

Average Size of Holding Haa

22b

22b

22

33

33

no data

Number of Holdings

246

411

414

235

551

no data

Average Labor Use per Holding Family
Labore Han/Years

1. 4ld

1.4ld

1. 31

1 , 31

1. 24

no data

Average Labor Use per Holding Hired
Labore Man/Years

1. 46f

1. 46 f

1.44

0 . 84

0 . 48

no data

Average Total Labor Use Man/Years

2.87

2 . 87

2.88

2.14

1. 72

no data

1,192

505

948

no data

Total Areas of Sector Ha

Net Increase in Employment Man/Years

706

1,179

1,857

4,530

3 Kenneth L. Braber, La Vida Agricola en las Coloni as, Comite de Obra Rural-Distrito Oriental Iglesia Evangelica
Metodista en Bolivia (Montero, 1972) , pages 44 and 45 .
bExtrapolated from data for Sagrado Corazon. The Chane and Agua is sectors have many holdings of larger commer cial farmers. These holdings are, however, balanced by the large number of small holdings noted in the aerial
photographs.
crbid ., page 76 .
dExtrapolated from data for Cuatro Ojitos .
erbid .• page 76.
fExtrapolated from data for Cuatro Ojitos.

w
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him during this period.

The laborers are often recruited from the colon-

ist's home village in the highlands.

This period of work as a contract

harvester provides a very useful exposure for the fut ur e colonist to the
problems and advantages of settling in the tropical lowlands.

The strong

demand for government to open up new areas for settlement is a demonstration
of the success of this exposure.

Economic Return to Public Investment in Infrastructure

Public investment
Although access roads may be the prin ciple stimulus to settlement
and development of new lands, services such as medical assistance , schooling , water supply , c r edit and extension are needed for the origina l
settlement gains to be consolidated.

These services should be provided

in response to the demands of settlers as channels develop for

fueir needs

to be articulated .
In this study only government expenditure on road wo r k , medica l
assistance , schooling and water supply has been col l ected (Table 8,
page 39).

No accou nt has been taken of agricultural extension work or

credit extended si nce no credit was granted for rice production in 1971- 72
as a matter of government policy because of r ice surpluses.

Extension

\Wrke rs are only rarely able to reach the Chane - Piray area due to lack of
money to pay for their travel and because of the pressure to serve commer cial farming interests located closer to Santa Cruz .

Road construe t ion
Due to greate r priority in other areas of the economy, the standards
for farm to market roads in Bolivia are very low .

In the tropical low-

lands roads, with the road platform built up from soil excavated f r om the
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Table 8 .

Public Investment:
Bolivia , 1972

Annual Equivale nt Costs, Chane-Piray Area,

Annual
Equivalent Costs
Road Construction
Survey for road alignment September
1970
Road construction personnel
November - December 1970
Total construction costs amortized
for 20 years at 15%
Total road construction
\'ater Supply
Hell drilling for drinking water
11 ~;ells of 4 inch diameter
September 1968
4 ~;ells of 6 inch diameter
August 1970
Total drilling costs amortized for
25 years at 15%

$b 10,146
20,977
39,658
$b 70,781

$b 11,304

$b269 , 108
134 250
$b403,358

62,399

$h hS,OOO
40,800
60,000
$bl65 ,800

165,800

$bl32 ,600
20 , 000
$bl52 ,600

152,600

Ministry of Health
Maintenance of 2 dispensaries

2 doctors@ $b32 ,500 per year
4 nurses @ $b l0,200 per year
Equipment and drugs
Total a nnu al costs

Hinistry of Education
t-laintenance of nine schools
17 teachers @ $b7,800 per year
Books and equipment
Total annual costs

TOTAL ANNUAL EQUIVALENT COSTS

$b392 , 103

site and tvith no additional materials such as gravel being used for

surfacing, are conside red adequate as long as they are closed to traffic
after rain and preven tive maintenance is done regularly in the dry season .
Total expenditure by the Servicio Nacional de Caminos on the Chane-

Piray road is detailed in Table 8, above.

The Bolivian Transport Survey

suggests dirt roads of the Chane-Piray t ype should be amortized over a
twenty year period .

The total annual equivalen t cost is $bll,304.
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Potable wate r supply
Although the area has a well distributed rainfall in excess of 1,300
rnilimeters and a dry season that is not severe, the shortage of drinking

water at times causes great hardship .

The nature of the alluvial flood

plain n1eans that no sources of good drinking water, such as springs, are

available naturally.
As soon as the dry season begins the shallow stvamps and water courses

dry up.

Easily contam inated shallow wells must be used or a long trek

made to the rivers Piray or Grande.

Luckily for the area , an artesian

sourc e of good qua lity water is foun d at a depth of about 120-160 meters.
Obras Publicas, the public works organization of the Department of Santa
Cruz has drilled 15 wells of 4 inches and 6 inches in di ameter in the
area to supply most of the incipient population centers.

Great satis-

faction has been expressed by the colonists with this supply.
effective life of the ''ells is taken as 25 yea rs.

The

The total annual

equivalent cost is $b62,339.
Health serv ices

As discussed in the section on spontaneous colonization, there is a
consi de rabl e health hazard in moving from the highlands to the tropl.c al

l owlands .

Without the support of health services, settler r esilience and

enthusiasm would decline rapidly.

In r ecognition of this, the central

government provides staff for two dispensaries (pastas sanitarias) at

Sagrado Corazon and San Ped r o.

The government philosophy is that, if

colonists will build the dispensary and provide housing for the staff ,
then the gover nment will pay the salaries of the staff and will also
furnish some drugs.

The facility at San Pedro is a primitive low- cost

structure with palm leaf roof and walls .

At Sagrado Corazon a brick
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structure built with funds raised by Italian students working in conjunction with the Silesian fathers f r om Huyurina (Montero) serves as a
dispensary .

The total annual cost of the health services is $bl65 , 800 .

Education

The government philosophy as regards the supply of educational ser vices is the same as for the health services, with the colonists being
responsible for construction of schools and housing for teachers.

There

are a total of nine schools with seventeen teachers in the project area .
The largest school at San Pedro has six teachers and five years of schooling are provided .

The colonists show great interest in obtaining the

best schooling possible for their children.

The total annual cost of

the educational services provided by the government is $bl52,600.

Comparison of Costs and Benefits

Normally, the cost benefit ratio or the internal rate of return is
used as a measure of comparison between alternative p r ojects and to
determine which project will give the greatest return to the capita l
resources us ed .

In this study only the annual equivalent costs incurred

by the government are compared with the g r oss and net benefits obt ained
in 1971- 72.

This was done because i t proved difficult to predict the

shape of future cost and benefit st reams .

Of particular difficulty in

predicting the shape of future cost and benefit streams are unknowns
such as :
(l)

The futu re rate of land abandonment by rice growers .

(2)

The poss ibility that ranchers will buy at a c heap price the

semi - cleared , but abandoned r ice land.
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(3)

The possibility of the introduction of profitable new crops ,

such as sunflower and soya which may make a difference in the areas of
rice monoculture as to whether the colonists abandon their land or
practice crop rotation .

Costs
A value has only been put on government resources committed to the
area.

Fiscal land was considered as free or having no value until it

was made accessible by construction of the access road.

The original

investment by the Gulf Oil Company in making an exploration track that
subsequently became the access road was considered to have no salvage
value.

Also, no value \vas placed on labor by colonists for work such as

road maintenance, building of schools and dispensaries, etc.

It \Vas

considered that the labor had near z ero cost because the work was done

during the slack time in the agricultural year.

Gross benefits
For calculation of gross benefits, no value was placed on labor used
ir. production, since it was considered that in the highlands, where the

colonists came from, the marginal value product or opportunity cost of
their labor was zero.

This position can be taken if the figure mentioned

previously of a 50% unemployment and underemployment rate for the
Bolivian work force in 1972 is accepted .

No production was foregone in

the highlands after the colonists moved except that used for their
subsistence.

The only direct benefit calculated \vas the value of the

agricultural output based on farm gate value (Table 9, page 43) .

No cal-

culation ivas made for the benefits obtained from reduced transportation
costs from increased volume of agricultural products marketed.

Indirect
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Table 9.

Gross Ret urn to Government Investment, Cltane-Piray Area , Bolivla,
1971-72

Amount

Annual Equival ent Costs

$b

Farm Gate Gross Value of Regional Agricultural
Production

$bl4,230,918

Annual Return Government Investment

392 ,1 03

3495

benefits such as the multiplier effect on the r egio nal economy from
development of the area and the creation of employment opportunities Hith
the subsequent wealth generation \Vere not included.

An annual gross

return to government investment in 1971- 72 of 3,L•95 was obtained.

Net benefits
For calculation of net benefits agricultural labor has been valued
at the wage it commands in conunercial agriculture in the Department of
Santa Cruz .
give

t.he

Tables 27 to 29 give the production costs and Tables 30 to 32
totaJ. return to land a nd management for the various crops in

each sector.

These returns to land and management totaled $b4,511,013 as

shown in Table 10, page 44.

Since this value is for 1972 only, i t

may underestimate r eturn for the project life, since only part of the area
is developed.

Net ben e fits with government paying
all road construction costs
The government ' s expenses for road construction have been very low,
since advantage ~;as taken of the original investment of the Gulf Oil
Company and work and money raised by the colonists.
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Table 10.

Net Re turn to Government Investment, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia,
1971-72

Amount

Annual Equivalent Costs

$b

Net Benefits

$b4 , 511, Ol3a
$b9,77l,276b

Annual Return to Govermnent Investment

392,103

1,045 3

2,380b
3

\.Jith family labor paid at corrnnercial l;vage rates .

brncludes net benefits of $b5 ,2 60,263 considered paid to family labor.
Family labor would have been unemployed if i t had not moved to Chane-Piray
area.

If the government is to contemplate opening up another area equival-

ent to the Chane-Piray Area, then the costs of road construction will be
much higher.

CosLs of $b60,000-$b72,000 per kilometer for local access

roads in the lowland regions of moderate to heavy rainfall are suggested .

27

Net benefits from the Chane-Piray Area with government paying the full

construction costs of $b60 ,0 00 per kilometer for the 65 kilometers of the
access road that are fully settled , plus all the other water supply,
educational and health costs have been worked out in Table 11, page 45.

Economic Factors Operating Along Access Road

The advantages of location
The principle stimulus for the initiation of spontaneous colonization
is the construction of access roads.

The quality of the transport

27
stan f ord Resea r ch Institute , et al ., Final Report Bolivia Transport
Survev, Highways, Volume 4 (La Paz, Bolivia, 1968), page 288.
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Table 11.

Net Return to Government Investment Including Road Construction

Costs of $b60 ,000 per Kilometer for 65 Kilometers, Chane-Piray
Area, Bolivia, 1971-72

Amount

Annual Equivalent Costs

$bl,003,629

Net Benefits

$b4,5ll,Ol3
348

Annual Return of Government Investment

facilities available to move the initial production of the colon ists

plays a large part in determining the success or failure of the colonization venture.

Proximity to a reliable highway provides great advantages.

In the case of the Chane-Piray area, colonists located close to the
paved road do not face the problems of colonists at the end of the access
road, Hho must transport their products for long distances along a very

poor road.

The changes in crops grown (Table l, page 26) , the changes in

net return to land and management (Table 4, page 30) and the changes in
the index of net return to land and management per unit of cultivated land

(Table 12, page 46) show how the location advantages operate .

The index

of net return in different sectors clear l y shows the great advantages

enjoyed by those with better transport facilities.

Intensity of land use
Location advantages will direct l y influence the intensity of land
use .

Increasing transport costs and increasing isolation of the colonists

as one goes down the access road will be r eflected in the decreasing

relative value of production per unit of total land area served by the
road.

These changes are shown in Ta ble 13, page 47.

The very low value

Table 12.

The Index of Net Return to Land and Hanagement per Unit of Cultivated Land, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia,
19 71 -72 (Chane taken as 100%)

Net Return

% of Total
Cultivated
Secto r

3

Land Area of
Sec tor Ha

% of Total
Cultivated
Land Area

Net Return

Net Return to

to Land and

Land and

Hanagement $b

Management

to Land and
Nanagement
per Haa of
Cultivated
Land $b

Index of Net
Return to Land
and Nanagernen t

per Unit of
Cultivated Land Area

Chane

1 , 828

19.5

l, 711,461

37 . 9

936

100 . 0

Aguais

3,231

34.5

1,525 , 520

33.8

412

50.4

Sagrado Corazon

1 , 722

18.4

534, 165

11.9

310

33.3

San Pedro

1,001

10 . 6

302, 185

6.7

301

32.5

Calama

J , 422

15.1

394,671

8.7

277

29.6

El Carmen

___rJ}_

____.!_:_2_

~Oll

1.0

243

27 . 0

Total

9 , 381

100.0

4 , 5ll,Ol3

100 . 0

Ha or hectares .

..,.

"'

Table 13 .

Th e I ndex of Agg r egate Pro duc tion per Unit of Total Land Ar ea , Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia , 1971- 72
(Chane taken as 100%)

Gr oss Value of

Land Area of
Secto r

Sector Hectares

% of Total
Land Area

Agri cul tural
Produ ction $b

% of Gross
Valu e of
Ag ri c ul tur al
Production

Gr oss Value of
Agricultu r al

Index of
Agricultural

Pr o duction per

Production per

Hec t a r e of Total
Land Ar ea of Sector

Unit of Total
Land Ar ea

Chane

5 , 426

8.6

3 , 788 , 864

26 . 6

698

100 . 0

Aguais

9,050

14.4

4,65 8 , 262

32.7

514

73. 4

Sagrado Co ra zon

7 ,lll

14 .5

2, 288 , 034

16 . 1

321

35.9

San Pedro

7,767

12.4

1,354, 48 8

9.5

17 4

24.8

Calama

18 ,209

28 . 9

1,907 , 630

13.4

104

15 . 0

E1 Carmen

13. 34 2

21.2

____231 , 64 0

1.7

17

2.6

Total

62 , 905

100.0

14 , 230 , 918

100 . 0
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for the ind ex as one approaches the end of the road raises the question
as to whether the level of production justifies expenditu r e on road

improvement.

A lot of the land in sectors such as San Pedro and Calama

has already been cropped to rice and then abandoned.
\./hen these changes are computed per kilometer of road (Table 14,
page 49) , then a basis ca n be established as to when i ncreased production
warrants upgrading of the road .

Whe r e new ag r icultural areas are being

divided into holdings of 25 to 50 hectares for intensive farming by
colonists , the recommendation 28 is that local access roads should be

provided at a rate of one kilometer to each 100 to 200 hectares of cul tivated land.

As can be seen, the first 14 kilometers of the access

road have a much higher intensity of land use with the sectors of Chane
and Aguais already having 305 hectares and 404 hectares , respectively , of
cultivated land per kilometer of road and production valued at $b631 , 477
and $b582,282 per kilometer .
The Soc ial and Economic Conditions of the Co l onists
It 1wuld appear

out~;ardly

that most underemployed and land - hungry

peasants from the highlands would benefit by leaving their villages to
take a land grant in the resource rich t r opical lmvlands .

however, has stressed tha t t hose colonists sett l ing t he

considerable isolation and hardship.

11

This study ,

frontier " suffer

\-Tho these pioneer families are

that have chosen to abandon their t r anditional

~;ay

of l ife, and

ho~;

they

have fared in their colonization venture is of consider able importance
to the evaluation of spontaneous colonization .
28

Four communit i es on which

stanford Research Institute , et al., Final Report Bolivia Transport

Survey, Highways , Volume 4 (La Paz, Bolivia , 1968) , page 288.
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Table 14.

Hectares Cultivated and Value of Production per Kilometer of
Road, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971-72

Hectares

Value of

Cultivated

Production per
Kilometer $b

Distance from

Paved Road
Sector

Kilometers

per Kilometer

Chane

0-6

305

631,477

Aguais

6-14

404

582,282

Sagrado Corazon

14-26

143

190,699

San Pedro

26-34

125

169,311

Calama

34-65

46

61,536

El Carmen

65-85

9

11,682

110

115,775

Average

d.<lt~ M

is available for 1970-71 from the study by Kenneth Graber, _!:.a Vidd

Agricola en las Colonias 29 , are discussed.

The data has been divided

into social and economic factors.
The four communities are:

(1)

Cua tro Oj itos Hhich is sited on the paved road and was founded

in 1956.
(2)

Sagrado Corazon which is 35 kilometers from the paved road and

was founded in 1966.
(3)

San Pedro Hhich is 45 kilometers from the paved road and was

founded in 1966 .
(4)

Calama which is 60 kilometers from the paved road and was

founded in 1967.
Kenneth Graber , La Vida ~cola en las Colonias , Comite de Obra
Rural, Distrito Oriental Iglesia Evangelica Metodista (Montero , Bolivia ,
29

1972).
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The data is based on a 10% sample of the colonists in each colony.30

Social factors

Educational level

The rate of illiteracy for Bolivia was estimated in 1961 at 70% for
the country and at about 80% in the rural areas. 31

The colon i sts , if

they were the disadvantaged or landless sector of the rural population
of the highlands before moving, would be expected to have the highest
rate of illiteracy.

This idea turns out to be very far from the truth.

The colonists are, in fact , a well-educated group (Table 15, page 51).
The most isolated colony, that of Calama, which draws its members from

the Potosi Area is particularly interesting, having 41% of the heads of
households \Vith 4 to 6 years of fonnal education.

Rural Potosi is one

of the most isolated and back1.vard departments, so there has been a very

selective response to the expected rewards and difficulties of moving to
the lov1lands.

It is easy to conjecture that this mobile and well-educated group
\vould have migrated to the towns to add to the urban unemployed if

coloni.za tion opportunities had not been available.

Percentage that colortized on
their mm ini tiative
Mention was made earlier that in the directed colonization program

funded by the InterAmerican Development Bank, that 43% of the colonists
30Kenneth Graber, La Vida Agricola en las Colonias, Comite de Obra
Rural,Distrito Orienta l Iglesia Evangelica Metodista (Hontero, Bolivia,

1972), page 5.
3lsranford Research Institute, et al., Final Report Bolivia Transport

Survey, Economics, Part B, Volume 2 (La Paz, Bolivia, 1968), pages 4-29
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Table 15.

Years of Formal Education for Heads of Households, Chane-Piray
Area, Bolivia, 1971 3

Years of

Formal

Cua tro

Education

Oj i tos

Sagrado
Corazon

San Pedro

Cal a rna

0

26%

47%

44%

22%

1-3

44%

36%

28%

37%

4-6

27%

17%

20%

41%

7-9

2%

8%

3

Kenneth Graber, La Vida Agricola en las Colonias, Comite de Obra Rural ,
Distrito Oriental Iglesia Evangelica Metodista (Montero, Bolivia, 1972),
pages 39-40 .

sponsored by the p roj ect abandoned their land.

Nany returned to their

original villages, but others looked for better land in areas such as
that served by the Chane-Piray road.

Table 16, page 52 shows the

percentages of colo nists t hat came entirely of their own initiative and
at their own expense.

The colonies founded at an earlier date show

more colonists moved at government expense .
the colonists originally moved

This is an indication that

at gov e rnment expense to a government

project and t h en responded to the great er economic opportunities seen in
settling the Chane-Piray Area .

Family data
The ave r age household of a colonist can be described as that typical
of a young married fami ly (Table 17 , page 52).

The fathe r is 33 years of

age, has 2 to 3 children and has 1 r elative , usually either a parent or
unmarried brother, living in his house.

This corresponds well \·lith
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Table 16.

Percentage Who Colonized on their mvn In itiative, Chane-Piray

Area , Bolivia, 1971 3

Percentage that Colonized on
their own Initiative

Cua tro
Ojitos

Sagrado
Corazon

San Pedro

Calama

85.7

86.6

100

90.6

San Pedro

Calama

aGraber, page 51.

Table 17.

Family Data, Chane - Piray Area , Bolivia, l97la

Cuatro

Sagrado
Cora zon

Family Data

Ojitos

Average Age of Head of Household in Years

35.7

32.5

31.9

34 .l

3.3

2.0

2.1

2.9

5.9

5.2

5.4

5.6

Average Number of Children
in Household
Average Number of Persons in

Household
3

Graber, page 33.

assumptions on 'vhich age group would be most attracted to the economic
opportunities available in the tropical lowlands.

The close relatives who help with the agricultural work will often
use the family home as a springboard for their own colonization efforts .

Health
Moving from the healthy arid highlands to the humid tropics can be
traumatic in itself.

When this move to a ne"v environment with completely

new health hazards is made

~.Jith

no government health services to support

the colonists , it can be easily understood if failures are many.

One of
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the greatest fear

of the colonist is to fall ill during a crucial period

in the crop cycle and thus lose his crop.

The number of days lost due to

sickness in Table 18, below, gives a good idea of how great this risk is.
An average of a month of work lost in every year is a heavy toll to pay.
Many of the illnesses \vill leave the colonists severely debilitated.

Table 18 .

Average Number of Days of Work Lost Due to Sickness per Year,
Chane - Piray Area, Bolivia, 197la

Cuatro
Ojitos

Average Number of Days Lost
per Year

36

Sagrado
Corazon

28

San Pedro

21

Calama

31

aGraber, page 34-35 .

Permanence of settlement
For those at the end of the access road feeling the worst of the
transportation difficulties and caught up in the unending toil of the
slash and burn cycle of rice monoculture, the temptation to abandon the

struggle to make a living on the "frontier 11 must be very real.

Those with

better transportation facilities will be less likely to be thinking of
moving as is shown in Table 19, page 54.

The fact that 15% of the popu-

lation of Calama intervie\ved are thinking of moving within a year shows

how marginal they consider their existence at the end of the road and
what little hope they have for an improvement in their circumstances.

The 6.7% of the population of Sagrado Corazon who are thinking of moving
are probably those who are running out of high forest .
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Table 19.

Permanence of Settlement, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 1971

3

Cuatro
Ojitos

Sagrado
Corazon

San Pedro

Ca1arna

1956

1966

1966

1967

Average Number of Years Lived
in Colony

7.8

3.9

3.9

3.2

Percentage \-lho are Thinking of
Hoving within l Year

l.3

6.7

0

Date when Colony was Founded

15 . 6

aGraber, page 30.

Economic factors
For the colonist to survive during the period of initial settlement ,
he Hill have to grmv at least one crop

cash return.

~vhich

This crop is usually rice.

can prov i de him with a quick

For the colonist to expand his

farming operation and increase his standard of living he will have to
diversify his production with more capital int ensive enterprises such as
sugar cane or livestock production.
use of yield increasing

technology~

This expansion will require greater
greater access to organized markets

and increased availab i lity of capital and credit.

In examining the

various economic factors affecting the colonists' success in converting
from a subsistence level of living to the status of a commercial farmer,
the effects of deteriorating transport facilities will be particularly
prominent.

Availability of production credit
One of the g reatest bottlenecks to expanded production experienced
by the colonists has been the lack of financial resources to hire extra
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labor during busy times in the agricultural ye ar , such as planting and
harvest.

In recognition of this

the government made available limited

amounts of production credit to rice growers.

available in 1970-71.

This credit \Vas last made

In 1971 -72 because of embarrassing national sur-

pluses of rice, no more credit \vas made available.

Hmvever, non-govern-

ment sources of credit provided by produce middlemen or rescatadores
continued.

Loans are made by these produce middlemen on the g uarantee of

the standing crop to colonists who do not have adequate funds to complete
the crop cycle.

Interest rates of 8 to 10% per month are charged with

adequate security.

The interest rate charged by the official Agricultural

Bank has a legal maximum of 12% per annum.

A loan from the Agricultural

Bank is, therefore, preferable if it is obtainable.

In 1970-71 the most

isolated colonies received the least credit and a considerable portion of
that

\Vas

made up of expensive credit supplied by the rescatadores (Table

20, page 56) .

It could be argued that institutional credit would be too

"risky" i n an unstable frontier area, such as Calama , where many colonists
a r e contemplating moving out of the a r ea .

Rescatadores

with their closer

personal connections with the colonists and high interest rates can
better tolerate this risk.

Use cf labor in agricultural
production
The colonists, when they arrive to claim tl1eir plot of jungle land,
bring with them little else except their enthusiasm and physical strength.
From this labor of cutting down the forest and planting crops, must
be created all the resou rc es to keep their families alive.

Their lives

for the first few years are little more than a struggle to keep alive
and slowly expand their foothold in the jungle.

Only slowly does their
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Table 20 .

Availability and Source of Credit , Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia ,
1970-71 a

Cuatro
Ojitos

Sagrado
Corazon

42

27

12

10

Direct from Agricu ltur al Bank

58

25

67

34

Percent that Received Agricultural
Bank Funds Directed through
Cooperatives

27

50

33

33

Percent that Received Credit

San Pedro

Calama

Percent that Received Funds

Percent that Received Funds

from Rescatadores

33

Percent that Used other Sources
Friends , Neighbors , etc.
8

15

25

Graber, pages 61 -63 .

way of life pass from that of subsistence living to full participation
in commercial agriculture.

In the early years

~vhile

establishi ng them-

selves, colonists will often hire themselves out as laborers to work for
their richer neighbors or for the large commercial farms nea r er Santa
Cruz .
As their economic circumstances improve , they will in turn hire
labor to expand thei r production .

As Table 21, page 57 , shows, the

widespread us e of hired labor is a n indi cat ion of the involveme nt and
integration of the colonists into the wider economy .
more isolated colonies use less hired labor.

As expected , the

One interesting point is

the numbe r of co l onists who hired themselves out for wage labor .

Little

of the traditional highland c ustom of mutual help without payment of
wages within a community seems to have survived the conlonists ' entry
into commercial ag riculture.
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Table 21.

Use of Labor in Agricultural Production, Chane-Piray Area,

Bolivia, 1970-?la

8

Cuatro
Ojitos

Sagrado
Corazon

San Pedro

Calama

Percent \fho Worked for other
Persons for a Wage

11.70

85.00

48.00

50.00

Percent Who Hired Labor

67 . 50

73 . 30

64.00

53.00

Family Labor used on the Farm
Han/Years

1.41

1.44

1. 31

1. 24

Hired Labor used on the Farm
Han/Years

1.46

1.44

0 . 84

0 . 48

Total Labor used on the Farm
Man/Years

2.87

2.88

2.15

1.72

Graber, pages 51, 54, and 76.

Technical assistance
Access to yield increasing technology is vital if the colonists are

to expand their agricultural production by increased productivity of their
labor and so improve their standard of living.

The colonists in the area

are not well served by the extension division of the Hinistry of Agriculture because l a r ge commercial farmers close r to Santa Cruz obtai.n
priority in assistance .

The cooperatives in the area, as well as the

produce middlemen , however, have a vested interest in giving technical
assistance to protect the colonists ' crops from insects and diseases, in
order to protect their loans.

The various sources of technical assistance

used by the colonists are given in Table 22, page 58 .

The experimental

station in Saavedra, which services the Department of Santa Cruz , is on

the main highway to Santa Cruz.

The surprisingly high use of the extension
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Table 22.

Sources of Technical Assistance, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia,
1970-71 a

Percent Who Used

Cuatro
Ojitos

Sagrado
Corazon

Extension Division Ministry of
Agriculture
Experimental Station

18

3

Cooperative

3

Commercia l Agency/Produce
Middleman

13

Neighbor

53

13

63

San Pedro

Calama

8

25

12

9

20

19

12

6

24

22

Graber, pages 49~ 50.

division of the Ministry of Agriculture by the colony of Calama could be
due to the high educational level of the colonists .

Marketing of crops
In most situations \vhere there is an underdeveloped marketing and

processing system, a group of middlemen traders will usually take advantage of the primary producers.

The Chane-Piray Area is no exception.

The increased distance from the main road, greater difficulties in
arranging for trucks to carry pr oduce to market and increased time away
from the farm to market crops all encourage the more isolated colonists
to sell their produce through middlemen.

Table 23, page 59, shows how

ttte more isolated colonists, because of greater marketing difficulties ,
are often forced to sell their p r oduce on the farm and thereby receive
lower prices.

The ve r y high percentage of colonists (63%) at Calama who

sell their crops Hithin the colony shows hmv great their marketing
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Table 23.

Crop Harketing Patterns Along Access Road, Chane-Piray Area,
Bolivia, 1970-7la

Cuatro
Ojitos

Percent Hho Sell Crops vri thin
their colony

Sagrado
Corazon

San Pedro

Calama

17

17

38

63

72 . 7

50

10

19

136

127

114

Percent Hho Received Rice Support

Price of $bl50/Fanega

Average Price Received for
Rice $b/Fanega
3

139

Graber, pages 55-58.

difficulties are and how they

must

be resigned to accept a price well

belmv the government support price of $bl50 per fanega.

Because of the

bad condition of the access road, the colonists at Cal a rna will be the
last group that the truck mvners '"ill want to contact for sale or transport of their rice.

Production and income data
~oductio~ .

All the various trends in access to markets,

availability of credit, etc., discussed previously should be reflected

in very considerable advantages to those enjoying a better location and
better transport facilities.

These advantages are reflected in the

production and gross income data shown in Table 24, page 60 .

With regards

to average gross income from annual crops, the expected trend is demonstrated by all colonies except Cuatro Ojitos .

It is suggested that the

unexpected low aver age gross income for annual crops in Cuatro Ojitos
(a much older colony) is due to scrub regrowth being clea r ed for crop
production .

Yields will be depressed by weed infestation and declining
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Table 24.

Crop P r o duction and Gross Income Data, Chane-Piray Area,

Bolivia , 1970-7la

Sagrado
Cora zan

San Pedro

5.3

6.6

6.7

Average Gross Income from
Annual Crops $b/Year

3,253

7,658

6,804

Avera ge Numbe r of Hectares in
Permanent Crops , Hectar es

10.2

1.8

2.0

Cuatro

Ojito s

Average Number of Hectares in
Annual Crops, Hectares

Average Gross Income from
Permanent Crops $b/Year

26,217

Percent \Vith Income from
Permanent Crops
8

70.1

295
16.7

Cal am a

4.8

5 , 173
1.7

180

8.0

157
12.5

Graber, pages 66 , 67.

fe rtilit y.

Hith regard to average gross income from permanent crops ,

the expec ted trends are

d~nonstr a ted

very strongly.

Only Cuatro Ojitos

has a suitable location to expl oit commercially permanent crop production
of sugar cane and bananas.

The hectares of p e rmanent crops reported for

the other areas are plantations of bananas, cit rus and yuca, mainly us ed
for home consumption with very limited sales being effected because of
high transport cos ts.
Liv estock production .

In an area of s urplu s maize and rice produc-

tion , it is s urprising that excess producti o n i s not converted into
marketable l ivest ock products, such as pork, l ar d, mil k , beef, etc ., for
which ther e is a strong internal and external demand .

Unfortunately , this

type of production requir es conside rable investment by the go verrunent in
supporting veterinary services to safeguard the health of the animals in
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the area.

This support has been almost totally lacking with livestock

being regularly devastated by ferocious epidemics which a r e common to
this humid tropical environment.
Because of the initial high investment required to start livestock
production with cattle (to establish a hectare of pasture with fencing

requires a minimum investment of $1,500 per hectare) and the risks of
losing ones ' animals f r om uncontrolled epidemics in pig product i on ,
colonists are not prepared to risk their hard won capital in livestock

production (Table 25 , below).

The very low gross income reported shm<s

that most livestock products are used for home consumption .

As expected ,

more people have horses or mules for transportation as the road deterior -

ates .

Tab le 25.

L iv estock Production and Gross Income, Chane-Piray Area ,
Bolivia, 1970 - 7la

Percent Who Have Cattle
Percent 1-/ho Have Pigs
Percent 1-/ho Have Sheep or Goats
Pe r cent l-ll1o Have Horses o r Mu les

Cuatro

Sagrado

Ojitos

Corazon

11.7

3.3

0.0

3. 2

9.1

6.7

4.0

9.4

12.4

6. 7

4.0

o.o

0.0

6. 7

4.0

9.4

203 . 0

0.0

110 . 0

137 . 0

San Pedro

Calama

Average Gross from Livestock

$b/Year
aGraber , pag es 68 , 69.

Net income
Al l

the economic t rends mentioned previously 1vork to the disadvantage

of most recently ar r ived settle r s who mus t occupy the most isolated land.
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The trends are reflected in net income data (Table 26 , below).
Ojitos, the colony

~vith

net income of $b2,140.

Cuatro

the best location, shows an average per capita
I f this figure is compared with the aver age per

capita net income of $US44 . 00 or $b528 quoted previously for the rural
population of Bolivia in 1969 , it can be seen that the colonists have

improved their standard of living very considerably by moving.

For those

near the end of the access road at Calama with a net income per capita of

only $b841, the advantages of moving are less obvious if one takes i nto
consideration all the hardships and health hazards involved in the move
to the tropical lowlands .

The low average net income per capita for

Calama easily explains the instability of settlement mentioned previously
for this colony.

Table 26 .

Net Income Data, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 1970-lla

Average Income per Farm $b

Cuatro

Sagrado

Oj itos

Corazon

San Pedro

12,625

9,433

5,476

4,709

4,399

3' 275

2 , 547

2' 7 38

2,140

1,747

·1 '053

841

Calama

Average Income per Adult Horker

$b
Average Income per Capita $b
3

Graber , page 75.
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LONG RUN IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT TRENDS
The basic thesis of this study is that knowledge of the economic
opportunities available, very limited operating capital and a firm market
for a few products have been combined by spontaneous colonizers to put
virgin land and idle labor to use in expanding Bolivia 's agricultural
production .
furth~r

How far continued expansion is self-sustaining without

government inputs for such activities as technological innovation,

introduction of new crops and rationalization of marketing wi ll now be
examined .
The first thing to mention is that the highland colonists are not
low performers because of lack of aspirations, but rather from lack of
opportunity.

The destructive cycle of rice monoculture has been adopted

by the more isolated colonists because of lack of opportunity to adopt
any other type of agricultural production .

The lack of economically

viable alternative crops has left the colonists t r apped in their nomadic
" slash and burn" cycle .

The long-run implications of the growth of this

cycle and its expansion from the addition of new colonists , in forest
destruction, soil deterioration, instability in community formation, and
was te of human energy are serious.

As the government prepares to cope

with the expected increased flow of colonists from the highlands , plans
should be made so that future colonists will be able to establish prosperous and stable farming communities.
Up to the present , the dimensions of the problem of the "hollow
frontier" of abandoned land and unstable communities as the colonists
move on to look fo r new land with high forest, has been masked by the
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rapid expa nsion of comme rcial agricultu r e into the a bandoned land.

The

Santa Cru z Area has been enjoying a cotton boom for the la st few yea r s .

Cotton g rowing is a full mechanized and highly technologi cal activity
that is a lmost entirely confined to highly cap italized large commercial
farme r s or corporations .

The clearing of high forest to begin the growing

of cotto n is ext remely expensiv e at an average cost in 1972 of $b2,300
per hectare for 10 hours of work with a D8 bulldozer.

If a commercial

farme r can buy up the semi-aband oned land of a colonist which is mainly
scrub regrowth , he can save himself considerable land clearing costs.

The cos t of clea ring scrub regrowth averages out at $b 500-l,OOO per
hectare and only requir es 2 to 4 hour s of work with a DS Bulldozer .
current sale price fo r scrub regrowth la nd r anges
pe r hecta re depending on location.

an~<her e

The

from $b200-700

The margin in clearing costs acquired

by the commercia l farmer plays an important part in local capital accumulation.
It can be observed that the settling an d clearing of state l and and

sa l e of the partially improved property is starting to emerge as a way of
li fe fo r sorr1e colo nists who will have migrated successf ull y to ne w

front i e r ar eas twice in the last 1 0 years.

Sadly, the colonist ' s role

ha s frequently been that of contributing towards the development of someon e else ' s production unit, while making no progre~s towards his own
eco nomic and socia l improvement .

The colonist finds that 1vhile th e

conunercia l farmer expands his production, his mvn pioneering efforts earn
little more t han su rvival in pove r ty a nd ignorance.

Hmv much longer the

cotton boom c ontinues and conunercial fa rmers continue to reoccupy the
abandoned l and of the "ho llow frontier" is a matter for debate.

Also ,

fo r debate is the question whether the capital i ntensive and labor
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extensive cattle ranching enterprises will expand into areas with aban-

doned land where the climate is too wet for cotton such as the Chane- Piray
Area.

The Consequences from no Increase in Commitment of Government
Resources to Spontaneous Colonization

The obvious choice for the government when deciding tvhere to best
employ scarce resources will be to stimulate growth at the point where

immediate response will be greatest.

The greatest returns will be seen

to be obtained by expanding the opportunities of commercial farmers.
Already a dualistic pattern is emerging around Santa Cruz where food
production with primitive technology is being left to the colonists,
while commercial agricult ure concentrates with government support on

export and ind u strial crops .

This, unfortunately, has the result of

encouraging the consolidation and excessive concentration of large land
holdings in the more accessible and better lands with the exclusion of
the small farmers to the isolated "frontiers.''

Some of the colonists

with better location are managing to reach fo r a better level of living,
but the rest of them are being sque-ezed into tighter and tighter corners
by the more productive and advantaged commercial farmers.

If the colon-

ists remain trapped in their nomadic agriculture, and the level of living
of the mass of colonists as compared to the large farmers draws too \Vide
apart, then disruptive social upheavals as experienced by Bolivia during
the Agrarian Reform of 1952

~;ill

again threaten.

The invasion of large

properties, such as Chane-Bedoya, by colonists in 1970-7 1 , has already
signaled the threat of social conflict.
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The Expected Results from Increased Commitment
of Government Resources

If both welfare of the colonists and economic g r mvth are emphasized,

there are many attractive alternatives .

The Andean group (Pacta Andino),

of which Bolivia is a member, represents an inunense potential market for

agricultural products from the Santa Cruz Area.

The countries of the

group were deficient in wheat, milk products, vegetable oils, maize,
meat, rice, and timber to the value of $US400 million in 1972.

32

All of

these products could be supplied by the Santa Cruz Area .
With the provision by government and private enterprise of a system
of silos, price stabilization and exporting organizations to overcome
market limitations, the colonists could rapidly expand their production
\Vithout undue subsidy.

Provided \Vith profitable and stable markets for

their products, the colonists could give up their nomadic rice monoculture , practice crop rotation and introduce work animals, such as mules
or oxen .

The introduction of work animals would expand the cultivated

land area of a colonist to 10-20 hectares from the 2-4 hectares cultivated
at present by hand methods .

The use of work animals YJOuld increase the

productivity of labor by increasing the land area cultivated per colonist
and low·ering costs .

In the colonization areas , it is the very low

productivity of labor that partially accounts fo r the low standard of
living.
To the colonists , the crops that are particularly attractive are
maize and oil seeds , such as soya and sunflower.

The crops are attractive

because of the simple technology needed and the high yields obtained.
3211 Espectativas en Hercados Internacionales, 11 Panorama, Edicion 33
(Santa Cruz , Bolivia, 1972), page 5.
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The oil seed crop and industry whic h has been neglected up to the present

by the gove rnment would not only supply vegetable oil as an import substitute, but also soya bean meal for poultry and swine production.

With

a local volume oriented pork processing and marketing industry developed
\Vith soya bean meal , a market for maize would evolve.

A firm market for

maize and soya beans would r emove the development ce i ling that has
hovered over the colonists .

Processing the feed g r ains in situ through

livestock would provide a pr oduct less vulnerable to Bolivia ' s high
transport costs which has usually stopped domestic production being
competitive in internat i onal ma rkets.
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOHMENDATIONS

Bolivian agriculture is composed of two sectors, the over-populated
highlands and the resource rich, but under-populated lowlands.

During the

last 20 years the Bolivian government has devoted considerable resources
to the development of the tropical lowlands.

Since the lmvlands are

sparsely populated, agricultural colonization from the highlands was
selected to play a key role in development of the region.
The various government colonization programs to sponsor the movement
of population to the lowlands have not been particularly successful.
They have proved to be extremely expensive and suffered from lack of
adequate planning and coordination be t~veen government agencies.

Hhile government r esources were being devoted to development of the
tropical lowlands and planned colonization of selected areas, various
voluntary and uncontrolled migration patterns \vere developing.

These

movements of population developed in response to new economic opportunities
offered by availability of free land and gov ernment investment in roads
and other infrastructure in the lowlands.

This study is concerned with

settlement of virgin for est land in the Department of Santa Cruz by
people from the highlands without direct government help or stimulus.
This type of settlement is called spontaneous colonization.
The gene ral objective of this study was to clarify the factors involved in the initiation, subsequent rate of expansion and role that
spontaneous colonization could be expected to play in the development of
Bolivia ' s tropical lowlands.

Special attention was paid to the impact
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o f access roads on spontaneous colonization.

To make the study, an access

road serving an area opened up during the period 1966-72 by spontaneous
colonization Has selected.

Aerial photography of the immediate area of

the road, together "ith relevant data collected in the field between April
and July of 1972, "as used to evaluate the impact of the access road on
spontaneous colonization.

All government expenditures on road construe-

tion, potable water supply, education and medical services was compared
with the value of agricultural production from the area for the agricultural
year 1971-72.

Conclusions
-----(1)

The limited government investment in infrastructure for the

spontaneous colonization area studied was economically justified , if
analysis permits using gross regional product as a measure of benefits.
(2)

The investment had a major employment impact and met minimum

acceptable income standards .

(3)

The spontaneous colonization area examined show·ed that a

permanent and viable agriculture had been established

i~

areas of better

location at: low public investment cost.
(4)

The public investment cost for infrastructure in support of

spontaneous colonization was $US21 per family as compared to a cost of
$US1 , 605 per family reported for the last majo r government colonization
project.
(5)

As a process fo r settlement of the tropical frontier, spontan-

eous coloniza t ion showed great flexibility for responding to economic
opportun i t i es.

High levels of state involvement in the settlement process

introduced rigidities leading t o misallocation of resources.
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(6)

The widely held belief of spontaneous colonization in virgin

areas as t he most precarious and miserable form of subsistence agriculture,

wasteful of soil and forest resources only proved to be partia lly valid
for the more isolated colonies .

(7)

The cost and reliability of transportation proved to be the

key variable in the degree of successful and permanent settlement.
(8)

The limitations imposed by inability to find markets for certain

agricult ur al crops were severe.

(9)

The production gains obtained from putting idle land and labor

to \YOrk in the mo r e isolated areas 'vere only conside red temporary, unl ess

the colonists could be assisted to move forward technologically from the
primitive "slash and burn 11 cycle of land utilization.
(10)

If assistance for modernization of production was not made

available , then the government would be faced with accelerated forest
destruction and proliferation of marginal units.

Recommendations

(l)

The p rocess of moving people to the resource rich l01-1lands,

that started as an expensive and not very successf ul government initiative and has become a selfsustaining spontaneous movement, should be
treated as a valuable and dynamic force in Bolivia's development.

(2)

Explicit government support should be given to spontaneous

colonizatio n as a dynamic force that can open up frontier areas at low
cost by tapping the energy and initiative of the colonists and the enor mous conmtuni ty interest in roads, schools, etc .

(3)

Once permanent settlements have been established and land put

into production, go vernment should concentrate on supporting the
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colonists with adaptive research, credit, marketing development and pro-

motion of agro-industries.

This support \vill allow the modernization of

production techniques, the transformation of the present exploitive

agricultural methods and achieve the necessary increase in the productivity

of labor.
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Table 27.

Sugar Cane--Per Hectare Costs.
Area, Bolivia, 1971-72

Sale at Farm Gate, Chane-Piray

Plantation
Practice

Each 5 Years
$b/Hectare

Annual

$b/Hectare

Fixed Costs
Land preparation
Seed:

6 tons at $b.94

Planting :
Replanting:

by hand 20 men
7 men

Total fixed cost (Amortized for 5 years
at 15%)

$b

450

$b

134

564

168

300

90

100

_ _3_0

$bl,414

$b

422

$b

210

$b

960

Variable Costs

Cleaning :

men (3 times) at $b . 70

Harvesting:
yield

$bl5/ton for 50 tons/hectare

Total variable costs

Interest on operating capital (l/2 total
costs for 6 months at 15%)
Total annual cost
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Table 28.

Bananas--Per Hectare Costs.

Sale at Farm Gate, Chane-Piray

Area, Bolivia, 1971-72
Plantation
Practice

Each 5 Years
$b/Hec tare

Annual
$b/Hectare

$bl00

$b 30

500

150

$b900

$b270

Fixed Costs
Land preparation:

burning of rice

stubble
Banana transplants and transport

Planting:

20 men

Total fixed cost (Amortized for 5 years
at 15%)
Variable Costs
Cleaning:
Harvesting:

5 men (2 times) at $b60
1 0 men

Total variable costs

Interest on operating capital (1/2 total
variable costs for 6 months at 15%)
Total annual cost

$bl20

_gQ_
$b2Li0
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Table 29.

Dryland Rice--Per Hecta re Costs.

Sale at Farm Gate , Chane-

Piray Area, Bolivia , 1971-72

Variable Costs

Land preparation:

Seed:

cutting dmvn forest and burning

15 kilos a t $b2

Seeding :

2 men

Weeding:

6 men (2 times) at $b.72

Harvesting:

Food for harvesters

Hull rice :

3

$b

450
30
24

contract 10 fanegas at $b2.40 per fanegaa

Transportation :

$b/Hectare

field to farm

144
240
100
10

at $b4 per fanega

Total variable costs

$bl , 038

Interest costs on operating capital (1/2 total
variable cost for 6 months at 15%)

!!~_.1.'!.

Total annual costs

$bl , 077

1 Fanega equals 384 pounds of rough rice .
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Tabl e 30.

Sugar Cane Revenues , Production Costs and Returns to Land and
flanagement, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971- 72

Net on
Farm

Net on
Farm

Total
Annual

Profit to

Area in
Suga r

Total
Return to

1

Sector

p~: ~~na ~:~~=r~fir ~~~~=r~Gr Ma~:;~m:~~c He~~:;es ~~~::e::~t

Chane

55

2,7 50

1 ,41 8

1 , 332

1, 090

1 , 451, 880

Aguais

45

2 , 250

1 , 418

832

833

693 , 056

Sagrado
Corazon

Jl

1 , 550

1,418

132

Total
aTable 2 .
byield of 50 tons per hectare .
cTable 2 7 .

--------2 , 144 , 936
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Table 31.

Rice Revenues, Prod uction Costs and Returns to Land and Hanagement, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia , 1971-72

Net on
Farm

Value
Secto r

Per Fa
$bb

3

On Farm
Value

Total

Total

Per ~ac
$b

Per Had

Profit to
Land and
Hanagemente

Area in
Rice Ha

Annual

Return to

Land and
Hanagement

Chane

141

1,410

1,077

333

265

88,245

Aguais

141

1,410

1,077

333

1,267

421' 911

Corazon

140

1,400

1,077

323

1,485

479,655

San Pedro

138

1,388

l ,077

311

94 7

294,517

Calama

136

1,360

1,077

283

1,367

386,861

El Carmen

132

1,320

1,077

243

177

43 011

Sagrado

Total
3 Fa

means

1 '714 '2 00
fanega.

bTable 3.
cHa means hectare .

dYield of 10 fanegas per hectare.
eTable 29.
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Table 32 .

Banana

Revenues, Production Costs and Return to Land and

Hanagement , Chane - Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971-72

Value per

Total
Annual
Cost per

Profit to
Land and

Area in
Bananas

Hectare

Hec tareC

Hanagement

Hectare

Net on

Farm

Sector

Total
Return to

Land and
Hanagement

Chane

882

519

363

472

171 , 336

Aguais

882

519

363

1,131

410,553

Corazon

519

230

237

54,510

San Pedro

519

142

54

7,668

Calama

519

142

55

Sagrado

Total

651,877

aValu ed at $b.85 per 60 pound

bunch due to increased spoilage from lack

of transport to collect mature fruit.

bva l ued at $b.75 per 60 pound bunch due to increased spoilage from lack
of transport to collect mature fruit.

CTable

28.

